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Abstract 
1. Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the climate system have the potential to 
 accelerate human-induced climate change and even shift the Earth’s climate system, in part 
 or in whole, into new states that are very different from those experienced in the recent past 
 (for example, ones with greatly diminished ice sheets or different large-scale patterns of 
 atmosphere or ocean circulation). Some feedbacks and potential state shifts can be modeled 
 and quantified; others can be modeled or identified but not quantified; and some are 
 probably still unknown. (Very high confidence in the potential for state shifts and in the 
 incompleteness of knowledge about feedbacks and potential state shifts). 
 
 2. The physical and socioeconomic impacts of compound extreme events (such as 
 simultaneous heat and drought, wildfires associated with hot and dry conditions, or flooding 
 associated with high precipitation on top of snow or waterlogged ground) can be greater 
 than the sum of the parts (very high confidence). Few analyses consider the spatial or 
 temporal correlation between extreme events. 
 
 3. While climate models incorporate important climate processes that can be well quantified, 
 they do not include all of the processes that can contribute to feedbacks, compound extreme 
 events, and abrupt and/or irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes outside the 
 range projected by climate models cannot be ruled out (very high confidence). Moreover, the 
 systematic tendency of climate models to underestimate temperature change during warm 
 paleoclimates suggests that climate models are more likely to underestimate than to 
 overestimate the amount of long-term future change (medium confidence). 
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15. Potential Surprises: Compound Extremes and Tipping Elements  1 
KEY FINDINGS 2 
1. Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the climate system have the potential to 3 
accelerate human-induced climate change and even shift the Earth’s climate system, in part 4 
or in whole, into new states that are very different from those experienced in the recent past 5 
(for example, ones with greatly diminished ice sheets or different large-scale patterns of 6 
atmosphere or ocean circulation). Some feedbacks and potential state shifts can be modeled 7 
and quantified; others can be modeled or identified but not quantified; and some are 8 
probably still unknown. (Very high confidence in the potential for state shifts and in the 9 
incompleteness of knowledge about feedbacks and potential state shifts). 10 
2. The physical and socioeconomic impacts of compound extreme events (such as 11 
simultaneous heat and drought, wildfires associated with hot and dry conditions, or flooding 12 
associated with high precipitation on top of snow or waterlogged ground) can be greater 13 
than the sum of the parts (very high confidence). Few analyses consider the spatial or 14 
temporal correlation between extreme events. 15 
3. While climate models incorporate important climate processes that can be well quantified, 16 
they do not include all of the processes that can contribute to feedbacks, compound extreme 17 
events, and abrupt and/or irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes outside the 18 
range projected by climate models cannot be ruled out (very high confidence). Moreover, the 19 
systematic tendency of climate models to underestimate temperature change during warm 20 
paleoclimates suggests that climate models are more likely to underestimate than to 21 
overestimate the amount of long-term future change (medium confidence). 22 
15.1 Introduction 23 
The Earth system is made up of many components that interact in complex ways across a broad 24 
range of temporal and spatial scales. As a result of these interactions the behavior of the system 25 
cannot be predicted by looking at individual components in isolation. Negative feedbacks, or 26 
self-stabilizing cycles, within and between components of the Earth system can dampen changes 27 
(Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change). However, their stabilizing effects render such 28 
feedbacks of less concern from a risk perspective than positive feedbacks, or self-reinforcing 29 
cycles. Positive feedbacks magnify both natural and anthropogenic changes. Some Earth system 30 
components, such as arctic sea ice and the polar ice sheets, may exhibit thresholds beyond which 31 
these self-reinforcing cycles can drive the component, or the entire system, into a radically 32 
different state. Although the probabilities of these state shifts may be difficult to assess, their 33 
consequences could be high, potentially exceeding anything anticipated by climate model 34 
projections for the coming century. 35 
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Humanity is conducting an unprecedented experiment with the Earth system through the large-1 
scale combustion of fossil fuels and widespread deforestation and the resulting release of carbon 2 
dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere, as well as through emissions of other greenhouse gases and 3 
radiatively active substances from human activities (Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change). 4 
These forcings are driving changes in temperature and other climate variables. Previous chapters 5 
have covered a variety of observed and projected changes in such variables, including averages 6 
and extremes of temperature, precipitation, sea level, and storm events (see Chapters 1, 4–13). 7 
While the distribution of climate model projections provides insight into the range of possible 8 
future changes, this range is limited by the fact that models do not include or fully represent all 9 
of the known processes and components of the Earth system (e.g., ice sheets or arctic carbon 10 
reservoirs) (Flato et al. 2013), nor do they include all of the interactions between these 11 
components that contribute to the self-stabilizing and self-reinforcing cycles mentioned above 12 
(e.g., the dynamics of the interactions between ice sheets, the ocean, and the atmosphere). They 13 
also do not include currently unknown processes that may become increasingly relevant under 14 
increasingly large climate forcings. This limitation is emphasized by the systematic tendency of 15 
climate models to underestimate temperature change during warm paleoclimates (Section 15.5). 16 
Therefore, there is significant potential for our planetary experiment to result in unanticipated 17 
surprises and a broad consensus that the further and faster the Earth system is pushed towards 18 
warming, the greater the risk of such surprises. 19 
Scientists have been surprised by the Earth system many times in the past. The discovery of the 20 
ozone hole is a clear example. Prior to groundbreaking work by Molina and Rowland (1974), 21 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were viewed as chemically inert; the chemistry by which they 22 
catalyzed stratospheric ozone depletion was unknown. Within eleven years of Molina and 23 
Rowland’s work, British Antarctic Survey scientists reported ground observations showing that 24 
spring ozone concentrations in the Antarctic, driven by chlorine from human-emitted CFCs, had 25 
fallen by about one-third since the late 1960s (Farman et al. 1985). The problem quickly moved 26 
from being an “unknown unknown” to a “known known,” and by 1987, the Montreal Protocol 27 
was adopted to phase out these ozone-depleting substances. 28 
Another surprise has come from arctic sea ice. While the potential for powerful positive ice-29 
albedo feedbacks has been understood since the late 19th century, climate models have struggled 30 
to capture the magnitude of these feedbacks and to include all the relevant dynamics that affect 31 
sea ice extent. As of 2007, the observed decline in arctic sea ice from the start of the satellite era 32 
in 1979 outpaced that projected by almost all the models used by the Intergovernmental Panel on 33 
Climate Change’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (Stroeve et al. 2007), and it was not until 34 
AR4 that the IPCC first raised the prospect of an ice-free summer Arctic during this century 35 
(Meehl et al. 2007). More recent studies are more consistent with observations and have moved 36 
the date of an ice-free summer Arctic up to approximately mid-century (Stroeve et al. 2012; see 37 
Ch. 11: Artic Changes). But continued rapid declines—2016 featured the lowest annually 38 
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averaged arctic sea ice extent on record, and the 2017 winter maximum was also the lowest on 1 
record—suggest that climate models may still be underestimating or missing relevant feedback 2 
processes. These processes could include, for example, effects of melt ponds, changes in 3 
storminess and ocean wave impacts, and warming of near surface waters (Schröder et al. 2014; 4 
Asplin et al. 2012; Perovich et al. 2008). 5 
This chapter focuses primarily on two types of potential surprises. The first arises from changing 6 
correlations in extreme events which may not be surprising on their own but together can 7 
increase the likelihood of compound extremes, in which multiple events occur simultaneously or 8 
in rapid sequence. Increasingly frequent compound extremes—either of multiple types of events 9 
(such as paired extremes of droughts and intense rainfall) or over greater spatial or temporal 10 
scales (such as a drought occurring in multiple major agricultural regions around the world or 11 
lasting for multiple decades)—are often not captured by analyses that focus solely on one type of 12 
extreme.  13 
The second type of surprise arises from self-reinforcing cycles, which can give rise to “tipping 14 
elements”—subcomponents of the Earth system that can be stable in multiple different states and 15 
can be “tipped” between these states by small changes in forcing, amplified by positive 16 
feedbacks. Examples of potential tipping elements include ice sheets, modes of atmosphere–17 
ocean circulation like the El Niño–Southern Oscillation, patterns of ocean circulation like the 18 
Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, and large-scale ecosystems like the Amazon 19 
rainforest (Lenton et al. 2008; Kopp et al. 2016). While compound extremes and tipping 20 
elements constitute at least partially “known unknowns,” the paleoclimate record also suggests 21 
the possibility of “unknown unknowns.” These possibilities arise in part from the tendency of 22 
current climate models to underestimate past responses to forcing, for reasons that may or may 23 
not be explained by current hypotheses (e.g., hypotheses related to positive feedbacks that are 24 
unrepresented or poorly represented in existing models).  25 
15.2 Risk Quantification and Its Limits 26 
Quantifying the risk of low-probability, high-impact events, based on models or observations, 27 
usually involves examining the tails of a probability distribution function (PDF). Robust 28 
detection, attribution, and projection of such events into the future is challenged by multiple 29 
factors, including an observational record that often does not represent the full range of physical 30 
possibilities in the climate system, as well as the limitations of the statistical tools, scientific 31 
understanding, and models used to describe these processes (Zwiers et al. 2013). 32 
The 2013 Boulder, Colorado floods and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s in the central United States 33 
are two examples of extreme events whose magnitude and/or extent are unprecedented in the 34 
observational record. Statistical approaches such as Extreme Value Theory can be used to model 35 
and estimate the magnitude of rare events that may not have occurred in the observational record, 36 
such as the “1,000-year flood event” (i.e., a flood event with a 0.1% chance of occurrence in any 37 
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given year) (e.g., Smith 1987). While useful for many applications, these are not physical 1 
models: they are statistical models that are typically based on the assumption that observed 2 
patterns of natural variability (that is, the sample from which the models derive their statistics) 3 
are both valid and stationary beyond the observational period. Extremely rare events can also be 4 
assessed based upon paleoclimate records and physical modeling. In the paleoclimatic record, 5 
numerous abrupt changes have occurred since the last deglaciation, many larger than those 6 
recorded in the instrumental record. For example, tree ring records of drought in the western 7 
United States show abrupt, long-lasting megadroughts that were similar to but more intense and 8 
longer-lasting than the 1930s Dust Bowl (Woodhouse and Overpeck 1998).  9 
Since models are based on physics rather than observational data, they are not inherently 10 
constrained to any given time period or set of physical conditions. They have been used to study 11 
the Earth in the distant past and even the climate of other planets (e.g., Lunt et al. 2012; Navarro 12 
et al. 2014). Looking to the future, thousands of years’ worth of simulations can be generated 13 
and explored to characterize small-probability, high-risk extreme events, as well as correlated 14 
extremes (see Section 15.4). However, the likelihood that such model events represent real risks 15 
is limited by well-known uncertainties in climate modeling related to parameterizations, model 16 
resolution, and limits to scientific understanding (Ch. 4: Projections). For example, conventional 17 
convective parameterizations in global climate models systematically underestimate extreme 18 
precipitation (Kang et al. 2015). In addition, models often do not accurately capture or even 19 
include the processes, such as permafrost feedbacks, by which abrupt, non-reversible change 20 
may occur (see Section 15.4). An analysis focusing on physical climate predictions over the last 21 
20 years found a tendency for scientific assessments such as those of the IPCC to under-predict 22 
rather than over-predict changes that were subsequently observed (Brysse et al. 2013).  23 
15.3 Compound Extremes 24 
An important aspect of surprise is the potential for compound extreme events. These can be 25 
events that occur at the same time or in sequence (such as consecutive floods in the same region) 26 
and in the same geographic location or at multiple locations within a given country or around the 27 
world (such as the 2009 Australian floods and wildfires). They may consist of multiple extreme 28 
events or of events that by themselves may not be extreme but together produce a multi-event 29 
occurrence (such as a heat wave accompanied by drought [Quarantelli 1986]). It is possible for 30 
the net impact of these events to be less than the sum of the individual events if their effects 31 
cancel each other out. For example, increasing CO2 concentrations and acceleration of the 32 
hydrological cycle may mitigate the future impact of extremes in gross primary productivity that 33 
currently impact the carbon cycle (Zscheischler et al. 2014). However, from a risk perspective, 34 
the primary concern relates to compound extremes with additive or even multiplicative effects. 35 
Some areas are susceptible to multiple types of extreme events that can occur simultaneously. 36 
For example, certain regions are susceptible to both flooding from coastal storms and riverine 37 
flooding from snow melt, and a compound event would be the occurrence of both 38 
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simultaneously. Compound events can also result from shared forcing factors, including natural 1 
cycles like the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO); large-scale circulation patterns, such as 2 
the ridge observed during the current California drought (e.g., Swain et al. 2016; see also Ch. 8: 3 
Droughts, Floods, and Wildfires); or relatively greater regional sensitivity to global change, as 4 
may occur in “hot spots” such as the western United States (Diffenbaugh and Giorgi 2012). 5 
Finally, compound events can result from mutually-reinforcing cycles between individual events, 6 
such as the relationship between drought and heat, linked through soil moisture and evaporation, 7 
in water-limited areas (IPCC 2012).  8 
In a changing climate, the probability of compound events can be altered if there is an underlying 9 
trend in conditions such as mean temperature, precipitation, or sea level that alters the baseline 10 
conditions or vulnerability of a region. It can also be altered if there is a change in the frequency 11 
or intensity of individual extreme events relative to the changing mean (for example, stronger 12 
storm surges, more frequent heat waves, or heavier precipitation events).  13 
The occurrence of warm/dry and warm/wet conditions is discussed extensively in the literature; 14 
at the global scale, these conditions have increased since the 1950s (Hao et al. 2013), and 15 
analysis of NOAA’s billion-dollar disasters illustrates the correlation between temperature and 16 
precipitation extremes during the costliest climate and weather events since 1980 (Figure 15.1, 17 
right). In the future, hot summers will become more frequent, and although it is not always clear 18 
for every region whether drought frequency will change, droughts in already dry regions, such as 19 
the southwestern United States, are likely to be more intense in a warmer world due to faster 20 
evaporation and associated surface drying (Collins et al. 2013; Trenberth et al. 2014; Cook et al. 21 
2015). For other regions, however, the picture is not as clear. Recent examples of heat/drought 22 
events (in the southern Great Plains in 2011 or in California, 2012–2015) have highlighted the 23 
inadequacy of traditional univariate risk assessment methods (AghaKouchak et al. 2014). Yet a 24 
bivariate analysis for the contiguous United States of precipitation deficits and positive 25 
temperature anomalies finds no significant trend in the last 30 years (Serinaldi 2016). 26 
Another compound event frequently discussed in the literature is the increase in wildfire risk 27 
resulting from the combined effects of high precipitation variability (wet seasons followed by 28 
dry), elevated temperature, and low humidity. If followed by heavy rain, wildfires can in turn 29 
increase the risk of landslides and erosion. They can also radically increase emissions of 30 
greenhouse gases, as demonstrated by the amount of carbon dioxide produced by the Fort 31 
McMurray fires of May 2016—more than 10% of Canada’s annual emissions. 32 
A third example of a compound event involves flooding arising from wet conditions due to 33 
precipitation or to snowmelt, which could be exacerbated by warm temperatures. These wet 34 
conditions lead to high groundwater levels, saturated soils, and/or elevated river flows, which 35 
can increase the risk of flooding associated with a given storm days or even months later (IPCC 36 
2012). 37 
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1 Compound events may surprise in two ways. The ftrst is if known types of compound events 
2 recur , but are stronger , longer-lasting , andlor more widespread than dlOse experienced in the 
3 observational record or projected by model simulations for dIe future. One example would be 
4 simultaneous drought events in different agricultural regions across the country, or even around 
5 the world, that challenge the ability of human systems to provide adequate affordable food. 
6 Regions dlat lack dIe ability to adapt would be most vulnerable to tIllS risk (e.g., Fraser et al. 
7 2013) . Another example would be dIe concurrent and more severe heavy precipitation events that 
8 have occurred in the U.S . Midwest in recent years. Mter record insurance payouts following the 
9 events, in 20 14 several insurance companies, led by Fanners Insurance , sued the city of Chicago 
10 and surrounding counties for failing to adequately prepare for the impacts of a changing climate. 
11 Although dIe suit was dropped later that same year , their point was made: in some regions of the 
12 United States, dIe insurance industry is not able to cope with the increasing frequency and/or 
13 concurrence of certain types of extreme events . 
14 The second way in which compound events could surprise would be the emergence of new types 
15 of compound events not observed in dIe historical record or predicted by model simulations, due 
16 to model limitations (in temls of bodl their spatial resolution as well as their ability to explicitly 
17 resolve the physical processes dlat would result in such compound events), an increase in the 
18 frequency of such events from human-induced climate change, or both. An example is Hurricane 
19 Sandy, where sea level rise, anomalously high ocean temperatures, and high tides combined to 
20 strengdlen both dIe stonn and the magnitude of the associated stonn surge (Reed et al. 2015) . At 
21 the same time , a blocking ridge over Greenland-a feature whose strength and frequency may be 
22 related to both Greenland surface melt and reduced summer sea ice in the Arctic (Liu et al. 20 16; 
23 see also Ch. 11 : Arctic Changes) -redirected the stonn inland to what was, coincidentally, an 
24 exceptionally high-exposure location. 
25 [INSERT FIGURE 15.1 HERE] 
26 15.4 Climatic Tipping Elements 
27 Different parts of dIe Earth system exhibit critical thresholds, sometimes called "tipping points" 
28 (e.g., Lenton et al. 2008; Collins et al. 2013; NRC 2013; Kopp et al. 2016) . TIlese parts, known 
29 as tippillg elemerlfs, have the potential to enter into self-amplifying cycles dlat conullit them to 
30 shifting from their current state into a new state: for example, from one in which dIe sunUller 
31 Arctic Ocean is covered by ice , to one in which it is ice-free . In some potential tipping elements, 
32 these state shifts occur abmptly; in others, dIe commitment to a state shift may occur rapidly , but 
33 the state shift itself may take decades, centuries , or even millennia to play out. Often the forcing 
34 that commits a tipping element to a shift in state is unknown. Sometimes, it is even unclear 
35 whether a proposed tipping element actually exhibits tipping behavior. Though a combination of 
36 physical modeling, paleoclimate observations, and expert elicitations, scientists have identified a 
37 number of possible tipping elements in atmosphere-ocean circulation , the cryosphere , the carbon 
38 cycle , and ecosystems (Figure 15 .1 , left; Table 15 .1 ). 
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[INSERT TABLE 15.1 HERE] 1 
One important tipping element is the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), a 2 
major component of global ocean circulation. Driven by the sinking of cold, dense water in the 3 
North Atlantic near Greenland, its strength is projected to decrease with warming due to 4 
freshwater input from increased precipitation, glacial melt, and melt of the Greenland Ice Sheet 5 
(Rahmstorf et al. 2015; see also discussion in Ch. 11: Arctic Changes). A decrease in AMOC 6 
strength is probable and may already be culpable for the “warming hole” observed in the North 7 
Atlantic (Drijfhout et al. 2012; Rahmstorf et al. 2015), although it is still unclear whether this 8 
decrease represents a forced change or internal variability (Cheng et al. 2016). Given sufficient 9 
freshwater input, there is even the possibility of complete AMOC collapse. Most models do not 10 
predict such a collapse in the 21st century (NRC 2013), although one study that used 11 
observations to bias-correct climate model simulations found that CO2 concentrations of 700 12 
ppm led to a AMOC collapse within 300 years (Liu et al. 2017).  13 
A slowing or collapse of the AMOC would have several consequences for the United States. A 14 
decrease in AMOC strength would accelerate sea level rise off the northeastern United States 15 
(Yin and Goddard 2013), while a full collapse could result in as much as approximately 1.6 feet 16 
(0.5 m) of regional sea level rise (Gregory and Lowe 2000; Levermann et al. 2005), as well as a 17 
cooling of approximately 0°F–4°F (0°C–2°C) over the country (Jackson et al. 2015; Liu et al. 18 
2017). These changes would occur in addition to preexisting global and regional sea level and 19 
temperature change. A slowdown of the AMOC would also lead to a reduction of ocean carbon 20 
dioxide uptake, and thus an acceleration of global-scale warming (Pérez et al. 2013).  21 
Another tipping element is the atmospheric–oceanic circulation of the equatorial Pacific that, 22 
through a set of feedbacks, drives the state shifts of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation. This is an 23 
example of a tipping element that already shifts on a sub-decadal, interannual timescale, 24 
primarily in response to internal noise. Climate model experiments suggest that warming will 25 
reduce the threshold needed to trigger extremely strong El Niño and La Niña events (Cai et al. 26 
2014, 2015). As evident from recent El Niño and La Niña events, such a shift would negatively 27 
impact many regions and sectors across the United States (for more on ENSO impacts, see Ch. 5: 28 
Circulation and Variability). 29 
A third potential tipping element is arctic sea ice, which may exhibit abrupt state shifts into 30 
summer ice-free or year-round ice-free states (Lindsay and Zhang 2005; Eisenman and 31 
Wetlauffer 2013). As discussed above, climate models have historically underestimated the rate 32 
of arctic sea ice loss. This is likely due to insufficient representation of critical positive feedbacks 33 
in models. Such feedbacks could include: greater high-latitude storminess and ocean wave 34 
penetration as sea ice declines; more northerly incursions of warm air and water; melting 35 
associated with increasing water vapor; loss of multiyear ice; and albedo decreases on the sea ice 36 
surface (e.g., Schroder et al. 2014; Asplin et al. 2012; Perovich et al. 2008). At the same time, 37 
however, the point at which the threshold for an abrupt shift would be crossed also depends on 38 
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the role of natural variability in a changing system; the relative importance of potential 1 
stabilizing negative feedbacks, such as more efficient heat transfer from the ocean to the 2 
atmosphere in fall and winter as sea declines; and how sea ice in other seasons, as well as the 3 
climate system more generally, responds once the first “ice-free” summer occurs (e.g., Ding et 4 
al. 2017). It is also possible that summer sea ice may not abruptly collapse, but instead respond 5 
in a manner proportional to the increase in temperature (Armour et al. 2011; Ridley et al. 2012; 6 
Li et al. 2013; Wagner and Eisenman 2015). Moreover, an abrupt decrease in winter sea ice may 7 
result simply as the gradual warming of Arctic Ocean causes it to cross a critical temperature for 8 
ice formation, rather than from self-reinforcing cycles (Bathiany et al. 2016). 9 
Two possible tipping elements in the carbon cycle also lie in the Arctic. The first is buried in the 10 
permafrost, which contains an estimated 1,300–1,600 Gt C (Schuur et al. 2015; see also Ch. 11: 11 
Arctic Changes). As the Arctic warms, about 5–15% is estimated to be vulnerable to release in 12 
this century (Schuur et al., 2015). Locally, the heat produced by the decomposition of organic 13 
carbon could serve as a positive feedback, accelerating carbon release (Hollesen et al. 2015). 14 
However, the release of permafrost carbon, as well as whether that carbon is initially released as 15 
CO2 or as the more potent greenhouse gas CH4, is limited by many factors, including the freeze–16 
thaw cycle, the rate with which heat diffuses into the permafrost, the potential for organisms to 17 
cycle permafrost carbon into new biomass, and oxygen availability. Though the release of 18 
permafrost carbon would probably not be fast enough to trigger a runaway self-amplifying cycle 19 
leading to a permafrost-free Arctic (Schuur et al. 2015), it still has the potential to significantly 20 
amplify both local and global warming, reduce the budget of human-caused CO2 emissions 21 
consistent with global temperature targets, and drive continued warming even if human-caused 22 
emissions stopped altogether (MacDougall et al. 2012, 2015).  23 
The second possible arctic carbon cycle tipping element is the reservoir of methane hydrates 24 
frozen into the sediments of continental shelves of the Arctic Ocean (see also Ch. 11: Arctic 25 
Changes). There is an estimated 500 to 3,000 Gt C in methane hydrates (Archer 2007; Ruppel 26 
2011; Piñero et al. 2013), with a most recent estimate of 1,800 Gt C (equivalently, 2,400 Gt CH4) 27 
(Ruppel and Kessler 2017). If released as methane rather than CO2, this would be equivalent to 28 
about 82,000 Gt CO2 using a global warming potential of 34 (Myhre et al. 2013). While the 29 
existence of this reservoir has been known and discussed for several decades (e.g., Kvenvolden 30 
1988), only recently has it been hypothesized that warming bottom water temperatures may 31 
destabilize the hydrates over timescales shorter than millennia, leading to their release into the 32 
water column and eventually the atmosphere (e.g., Archer 2007; Kretschmer et al. 2015). Recent 33 
measurements of the release of methane from these sediments in summer find that, while 34 
methane hydrates on the continental shelf and upper slope are undergoing dissociation, the 35 
resulting emissions are not reaching the ocean surface in sufficient quantity to affect the 36 
atmospheric methane budget significantly, if at all (Myhre et al. 2016; Ruppel and Kessler 2017). 37 
Estimates of plausible hydrate releases to the atmosphere over the next century are only a 38 
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fraction of present-day anthropogenic methane emissions (Kretschmer et al. 2015; Stranne et al. 1 
2016; Ruppel and Kessler 2017).  2 
These estimates of future emissions from permafrost and hydrates, however, neglect the 3 
possibility that humans may insert themselves into the physical feedback systems. With an 4 
estimated 53% of global fossil fuel reserves in the Arctic becoming increasingly accessible in a 5 
warmer world (Lee and Holder 2001), the risks associated with this carbon being extracted and 6 
burned, further exacerbating the influence of humans on global climate, are evident (Jakob and 7 
Hilaire 2015; McGlade and Elkins 2015). Of less concern but still relevant, arctic ocean waters 8 
themselves are a source of methane, which could increase as sea ice decreases (Kort et al. 2012). 9 
The Antarctic and Greenland Ice Sheets are clear tipping elements. The Greenland Ice Sheet 10 
exhibits multiple stable states as a result of feedbacks involving the elevation of the ice sheet, 11 
atmosphere-ocean-sea ice dynamics, and albedo (Ridley et al. 2010; Robinson et al. 2012; 12 
Levermann et al. 2013; Koenig et al. 2014). At least one study suggests that warming of 2.9ºF 13 
(1.6°C) above a preindustrial baseline could commit Greenland to an 85% reduction in ice 14 
volume and a 20 ft (6 m) contribution to global mean sea level over millennia (Robinson et al. 15 
2012). One 10,000-year modeling study (Clark et al. 2016) suggests that following the higher 16 
RCP8.5 pathway (see Ch. 4: Projections) over the 21st century would lead to complete loss of 17 
the Greenland Ice Sheet over 6,000 years.  18 
In Antarctica, the amount of ice that sits on bedrock below sea level is enough to raise global 19 
mean sea level by 75.5 feet (23 m) (Fretwell et al. 2013). This ice is vulnerable to collapse over 20 
centuries to millennia due to a range of feedbacks involving ocean-ice sheet-bedrock interactions 21 
(Schoof 2007; Gomez et al. 2010; Ritz et al. 2015; Mengel and Levermann et al. 2014; Pollard et 22 
al. 2015; Clark et al. 2016). Observational evidence suggests that ice dynamics already in 23 
progress have committed the planet to as much as 3.9 feet (1.2 m) worth of sea level rise from 24 
the West Antarctic Ice Sheet alone, although that amount is projected to occur over the course of 25 
many centuries (Joughin et al. 2014; Rignot et al. 2014). Plausible physical modeling indicates 26 
that, under the higher RCP8.5 scenario, Antarctic ice could contribute 3.3 feet (1 m) or more to 27 
global mean sea level over the remainder of this century (DeConto and Pollard 2016), with some 28 
authors arguing that rates of change could be even faster (Hansen et al. 2016). Over 10,000 29 
years, one modeling study suggests that 3.6°F (2°C) of sustained warming could lead to about 70 30 
feet (25 m) of global mean sea level rise from Antarctica alone (Clark et al. 2016). 31 
Finally, tipping elements also exist in large-scale ecosystems. For example, boreal forests such as 32 
those in southern Alaska may expand northward in response to arctic warming. Because forests 33 
are darker than the tundra they replace, their expansion amplifies regional warming, which in 34 
turn accelerates their expansion (Jones et al. 2009). As another example, coral reef ecosystems, 35 
such as those in Florida, are maintained by stabilizing ecological feedbacks among corals, 36 
coralline red algae, and grazing fish and invertebrates. However, these stabilizing feedbacks can 37 
be undermined by warming, increased risk of bleaching events, spread of disease, and ocean 38 
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acidification, leading to abrupt reef collapse (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007). More generally, 1 
many ecosystems can undergo rapid regime shifts in response to a range of stressors, including 2 
climate change (e.g., Scheffer et al. 2001; Folke et al. 2004). 3 
15.5 Paleoclimatic Hints of Additional Potential Surprises  4 
The paleoclimatic record provides evidence for additional state shifts whose driving mechanisms 5 
are as yet poorly understood. As mentioned, global climate models tend to underestimate both 6 
the magnitude of global mean warming in response to higher CO2 levels as well as its 7 
amplification at high latitudes, compared to reconstructions of temperature and CO2 from the 8 
geological record. Three case studies—all periods well predating the first appearance of Homo 9 
sapiens around 200,000 years ago (Tattersall 2009)—illustrate the limitations of current 10 
scientific understanding in capturing the full range of self-reinforcing cycles that operate within 11 
the Earth system, particularly over millennial time scales. 12 
The first of these, the late Pliocene, occurred about 3.6 to 2.6 million years ago. Climate model 13 
simulations for this period systematically underestimate warming north of 30°N (Salzmann et al. 14 
2013). Similarly, during the middle Miocene (about 17–14.5 million years ago), models also fail 15 
to simultaneously replicate global mean temperature—estimated from proxies to be 16 
approximately 14°F ± 4°F (8°C ± 2°C) warmer than preindustrial—and the approximately 40% 17 
reduction in the pole-to-equator temperature gradient relative to today (Goldner et al. 2014). 18 
Although about one-third of the global mean temperature increase during the Miocene can be 19 
attributed to changes in geography and vegetation, geological proxies indicate CO2 20 
concentrations of around 400 ppm (Goldner et al. 2014; Foster et al. 2012), similar to today. This 21 
suggests the possibility of as yet unmodeled feedbacks, perhaps related to a significant change in 22 
the vertical distribution of heat in the tropical ocean (LaRiviere et al. 2012). 23 
The last of these case studies, the early Eocene, occurred about 56–48 million years ago. This 24 
period is characterized by the absence of permanent land ice, CO2 concentrations peaking around 25 
1,400 ± 470 ppm (Anagnostu et al. 2016), and global temperatures about 25°F ± 5°F (14°C ± 26 
3°C) warmer than the preindustrial (Caballero and Huber 2013). Like the late Pliocene and the 27 
middle Miocene, this period also exhibits about half the pole-to-equator temperature gradient of 28 
today (Huber and Caballero 2011; Lunt et al. 2012). About one-third of the temperature 29 
difference is attributable to changes in geography, vegetation, and ice sheet coverage (Caballero 30 
and Huber 2013). However, to reproduce both the elevated global mean temperature and the 31 
reduced pole-to-equator temperature gradient, climate models would require CO2 concentrations 32 
that exceed those indicated by the proxy record by two to five times (Lunt et al. 2012) —33 
suggesting once again the presence of as yet poorly understood processes and feedbacks. 34 
One possible explanation for this discrepancy is a planetary state shift that, above a particular 35 
CO2 threshold, leads to a significant increase in the sensitivity of the climate to CO2. Paleo-data 36 
for the last 800,000 years suggest a gradual increase in climate sensitivity with global mean 37 
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temperature over glacial-interglacial cycles (von der Heydt et al. 2014; Friedrich et al. 2016), 1 
although these results are based on a time period with CO2 concentrations lower than today. At 2 
higher CO2 levels, one modeling study (Caballero and Huber 2013) suggests that an abrupt 3 
change in atmospheric circulation (the onset of equatorial atmospheric superrotation) between 4 
1,120 and 2,240 ppm CO2 that could lead to a reduction in cloudiness and an approximate 5 
doubling of climate sensitivity. However, the critical threshold for such a transition is poorly 6 
constrained. If it occurred in the past at a lower CO2 level, it might explain the Eocene 7 
discrepancy and potentially also the Miocene discrepancy: but in that case, it could also pose a 8 
plausible threat within the 21st century under the higher RCP8.5 pathway.  9 
Regardless of the particular mechanism, the systematic paleoclimatic model-data mismatch for 10 
past warm climates suggests that climate models are omitting at least one, and probably more, 11 
processes crucial to future warming, especially in polar regions. For this reason, future changes 12 
outside the range projected by climate models cannot be ruled out, and climate models are more 13 
likely to underestimate than to overestimate the amount of long-term future change. 14 
  15 
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TRACEABLE ACCOUNTS 1 
Key Finding 1 2 
Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the climate system have the potential to 3 
accelerate human-induced climate change and even shift the Earth’s climate system, in part or in 4 
whole, into new states that are very different from those experienced in the recent past (for 5 
example, ones with greatly diminished ice sheets or different large-scale patterns of atmosphere 6 
or ocean circulation). Some feedbacks and potential state shifts can be modeled and quantified; 7 
others can be modeled or identified but not quantified; and some are probably still unknown. 8 
(Very high confidence in the potential for state shifts and in the incompleteness of knowledge 9 
about feedbacks and potential state shifts). 10 
Description of evidence base 11 
This key finding is based on a large body of scientific literature recently summarized by Lenton 12 
et al. (2008), NRC (2013), and Kopp et al. (2016). As NRC (2013, page vii) states, “A study of 13 
Earth’s climate history suggests the inevitability of ‘tipping points’—thresholds beyond which 14 
major and rapid changes occur when crossed—that lead to abrupt changes in the climate system” 15 
and (page xi), “Can all tipping points be foreseen? Probably not. Some will have no precursors, 16 
or may be triggered by naturally occurring variability in the climate system. Some will be 17 
difficult to detect, clearly visible only after they have been crossed and an abrupt change 18 
becomes inevitable.” As IPCC AR5 WG1 Chapter 12, section 12.5.5 (Collins et al. 2013) further 19 
states, “A number of components or phenomena within the Earth system have been proposed as 20 
potentially possessing critical thresholds (sometimes referred to as tipping points) beyond which 21 
abrupt or nonlinear transitions to a different state ensues.” Collins et al. (2013) further 22 
summarizes critical thresholds that can be modeled and others that can only be identified. 23 
Major uncertainties  24 
The largest uncertainties are 1) whether proposed tipping elements actually undergo critical 25 
transitions; 2) the magnitude and timing of forcing that will be required to initiate critical 26 
transitions in tipping elements; 3) the speed of the transition once it has been triggered; 4) the 27 
characteristics of the new state that results from such transition; and 5) the potential for new 28 
tipping elements to exist that are yet unknown. 29 
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 30 
nature of evidence and level of agreement 31 
There is very high confidence in the likelihood of the existence of positive feedbacks and tipping 32 
elements statement is based on a large body of literature published over the last 25 years that 33 
draws from basic physics, observations, paleoclimate data, and modeling.  34 
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There is very high confidence that some feedbacks can be quantified, others are known but 1 
cannot be quantified, and others may yet exist that are currently unknown.  2 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information 3 
The key finding is based on NRC (2013) and IPCC AR4 WG1 Chapter 12 section 12.5.5 (IPCC 4 
2007), which made a thorough assessment of the relevant literature. 5 
 6 
Key Finding 2 7 
The physical and socioeconomic impacts of compound extreme events (such as simultaneous 8 
heat and drought, wildfires associated with hot and dry conditions, or flooding associated with 9 
high precipitation on top of snow or waterlogged ground) can be greater than the sum of the parts 10 
(very high confidence). Few analyses consider the spatial or temporal correlation between 11 
extreme events. 12 
Description of evidence base 13 
This key finding is based on a large body of scientific literature summarized in the 2012 IPCC 14 
Special Report on Extremes (IPCC 2012). The report’s Summary for Policymakers (page 6) 15 
states, “exposure and vulnerability are key determinants of disaster risk and of impacts when risk 16 
is realized... extreme impacts on human, ecological, or physical systems can result from 17 
individual extreme weather or climate events. Extreme impacts can also result from non-extreme 18 
events where exposure and vulnerability are high or from a compounding of events or their 19 
impacts. For example, drought, coupled with extreme heat and low humidity, can increase the 20 
risk of wildfire.” 21 
Major uncertainties 22 
The largest uncertainties are in the temporal congruence of the events and the compounding 23 
nature of their impacts. 24 
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 25 
nature of evidence and level of agreement  26 
There is very high confidence that the impacts of multiple events could exceed the sum of the 27 
impacts of events occurring individually.  28 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information  29 
The key finding is based on the 2012 IPCC SREX report, particularly section 3.1.3 on compound 30 
or multiple events, which presents a thorough assessment of the relevant literature. 31 
 32 
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Key Finding 3 1 
While climate models incorporate important climate processes that can be well quantified, they 2 
do not include all of the processes that can contribute to feedbacks, compound extreme events, 3 
and abrupt and/or irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes outside the range 4 
projected by climate models cannot be ruled out (very high confidence). Moreover, the 5 
systematic tendency of climate models to underestimate temperature change during warm 6 
paleoclimates suggests that climate models are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate 7 
the amount of long-term future change (medium confidence). 8 
Description of evidence base 9 
This key finding is based on the conclusions of IPCC AR5 WG1 (IPCC 2013), specifically 10 
Chapter 7 (Flato et al. 2013); the state of the art of global models is briefly summarized in 11 
Chapter 4: Projections of this report. The second half of this key finding is based upon the 12 
tendency of global climate models to underestimate, relative to geological reconstructions, the 13 
magnitude of both long-term global mean warming and the amplification of warming at high 14 
latitudes in past warm climates (e.g., Salzmann et al. 2013; Goldner et al. 2014; Caballeo and 15 
Huber 2013; Lunt et al. 2012). 16 
Major uncertainties 17 
The largest uncertainties are structural: are the models including all the important components 18 
and relationships necessary to model the feedbacks and if so, are these correctly represented in 19 
the models? 20 
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 21 
nature of evidence and level of agreement  22 
There is very high confidence that the models are incomplete representations of the real world; 23 
and there is medium confidence that their tendency is to under- rather than over-estimate the 24 
amount of long-term future change. 25 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information 26 
The key finding is based on the IPCC AR5 WG1 Chapter 9 (IPCC 2013), as well as systematic 27 
paleoclimatic model/data comparisons. 28 
  29 
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TABLE 1 
Table 15.1: Potential tipping elements (adapted from Kopp et al. 2016). 2 
Candidate Climatic 
Tipping Element State Shift Main impact pathways 
Atmosphere–ocean 
circulation 
   
Atlantic meridional 
overturning circulation 
Major reduction in strength regional temperature and 
precipitation; global mean 
temperature; regional sea level 
El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation 
Increase in amplitude regional temperature and 
precipitation 
Equatorial atmospheric 
superrotation 
Initiation cloud cover; climate sensitivity 
Regional North Atlantic 
Ocean convection 
Major reduction in strength regional temperature and 
precipitation 
Cryosphere    
Antarctic Ice Sheet Major decrease in ice volume sea level; albedo; freshwater 
forcing on ocean circulation 
Arctic sea ice Major decrease in summertime 
and/or perennial area 
regional temperature and 
precipitation; albedo 
Greenland Ice Sheet Major decrease in ice volume sea level; albedo; freshwater 
forcing on ocean circulation 
Carbon cycle    
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Methane hydrates Massive release of carbon greenhouse gas emissions 
Permafrost carbon Massive release of carbon greenhouse gas emissions 
Ecosystem    
Amazon rainforest Dieback, transition to 
grasslands 
greenhouse gas emissions; 
biodiversity 
Boreal forest Dieback, transition to 
grasslands 
greenhouse gas emissions; 
albedo; biodiversity 
Coral reefs Die-off biodiversity 
  1 
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5 adapted from Lenton et al. 2008) . (right) Wildfire and drought events from the NOAA Billion 
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7 Dot size scales widl the magnitude of impact , as reflected by the cost of the event. TIlese high-
8 impact events occur preferentially under hot . dry conditions. 
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